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1. Introduction  
Schemes for sharing symmetric key operations such as block ciphers or message authentication 
codes have been of considerable recent interest, as evident from the significant contributions by 
Brickell et al. (2000),  Martin et al. (2003, 2005), Long et al. (2006), Martin and Ng (2007), 
Zaverucha and Stinson (2010) and others. Threshold access structures play a crucial role in this 
context. A ),( nt  threshold access structure involves n participants such that every group of t par-
ticipants has access to at least one key, while no set of  t–1 or fewer participants has access to any 
key. Let Γ be the collection of all groups of t participants, and let A denote any typical member of 
Γ . Thus, every )( Γ∈A , representing a group of t participants, is an authorized set.  
The key components are distributed to the participants by a receiver. Then one group )( Γ∈A of 
participants collaborate to perform a threshold operation such as encryption or authentication, using 
a key at their disposal, and sends the output of the shared operation back to the receiver. Once the 
receiver receives this message, he knows which key was used in the threshold operation. The objec-
tive is to prevent an adversary from learning which group of participants collaborated to perform 
the operation. The adversary may be the receiver or anyone knowing how key components are as-
signed to participants. So, given that a particular key was used, the issue of anonymity of the group 
)( Γ∈A of participants which has performed the threshold operation is of importance. Similarly, the 
anonymity of any individual participant, as a member of that group, is also of concern.  It is as-
sumed that the communication of the message to the receiver is done using an anonymous channel 
and all details of communications among the participants remain unknown to the adversary.  
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Martin et al. (2003) gave a measure for group anonymity which essentially measures the average 
degree of anonymity for a scheme. In a recent work, Zaverucha and Stinson (2010; hereafter re-
ferred to as ZS) proposed an elegant new scheme for sharing symmetric key operations amongst a 
set of participants according to a ),( nt  threshold access structure. Focusing attention on access 
structures based on perfect hash families (PHFs), they explored at length the question of anonym-
ity. They pointed out that anonymity should preferably be evaluated in the worst case instead of the 
average case and from this perspective, they gave a measure for group anonymity for their scheme, 
together with a measure of anonymity of any individual participant as a member of that group. 
They showed that their scheme ensures a higher level of anonymity than the existing ones. Accord-
ingly, we consider this scheme of ZS as our starting point.    
In this article, we adopt the measures of ZS and examine how, for a ),( nt threshold access struc-
ture determined by any given PHF, further improvement in anonymity can be achieved. In Section 
4, we propose a new scheme where, instead of all )( Γ∈A  being equally likely to use a key, as 
stipulated in the scheme of ZS, these groups A now act with appropriately assigned unequal prob-
abilities. We demonstrate that this new scheme has improved anonymity compared to the scheme of 
ZS and prove that it can, in fact, be optimal and equitable with respect to participant anonymity 
when based on a balanced PHF. In the process, in Section 3, we note that some results in ZS on par-
ticipant anonymity require re-evaluation and we set them in the proper perspective. Finally, in Sec-
tion 6, we show that our new scheme turns out to be quite promising even for threshold access 
structures which are given by combinatorial entities other than PHFs. 
2. Notation and Preliminaries 
For ease in reference, we begin with a brief description of PHFs and the associated ),( nt threshold 
access structures; for details on sharing symmetric key operations we refer to ZS and the references 
therein.  A  ),,;(PHF tmnl , 2≥≥ tm , can be depicted as an nl × array, say B, populated with m 
symbols, say 1,…, m, such that within every tl × subarray of B, there is a row containing t distinct 
symbols. Such a PHF is called balanced and is denoted by ),,;(BPHF tmnl  if the m symbols occur 
equally often in each row of B.    
Example 1. It can be easily checked that the following 63× array represents a )2,2,6;3(BPHF .   
 
   B = 1 1 1 2 2 2  
               1 1 2 1 2 2 
            1 2 2 1 1 2 
 
Following ZS, this BPHF(3:6,2,2) leads to a scheme with a (2,6) threshold access structure having   
(a) six [= (3)(2)] key components  
   (1,1), (1,2), (2,1), (2,2), (3,1), (3,2), 
such that each row index of B, coupled with a symbol in B, gives a key component;  
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(b) three keys  
)121( ×K ={(1,1), (1,2)}, )122( ×K  ={(2,1), (2,2)},  )123( ×K ={(3,1), (3,2)}, 
such that each key is given by the Cartesian product of a row index of B with the set of two sym-
bols in that row of B, and  
(c) six participants 61,..., PP , such that the key components given to any participant are dictated by 
the corresponding column of B, i.e., 1P  gets key components (1,1), (2,1), (3,1); 2P  gets key compo-
nents (1,1), (2,1), (3,2); 3P  gets key components (1,1), (2,2), (3,2), and so on.  
Thus, the pair of participants 1P  and 2P can recover only the single key )123( ×K while the pair 
1P  and 3P  can recover both keys )122( ×K  and )123( ×K . Clearly, any two participants together 
hold at least one key while no single participant can recover any key.         □ 
In general, a ),,;(PHF tmnl , when written as an nl ×  array B, leads to a scheme based on a 
),( nt threshold access structure involving  
(a) lm key components ),( jr , lr ≤≤1 , mj ≤≤1 ; 
(b) )(mtl keys denoted by )( JrK × , say, lr ≤≤1 , ∆∈J , where∆  denotes the collection of the 
)(mt t-tuples tjj ..1  satisfying mjj t ≤<<≤ ...1 1 , and for any J = )(...1 ∆∈tjj , the key )( JrK ×  
consists of the t key components ),( 1jr ,…, ),( tjr ; 
(c) n participants nPP ,...,1  such that, for nc ≤≤1 , participant cP  gets the l  key components 
),( rcbr , lr ≤≤1 , where Trcc bb ),...,( 1 is the c-th column of B.   
By (c), there is a one-to-one correspondence between the participants and the columns of B, and 
hence by (b), any group of w participants can recover a specific key )( JrK × , J = tjjj ...21 , if and 
only if the symbols tjjj ,...,, 21  appear in the rth row of the corresponding wl × subarray of B. 
Therefore, as noted in ZS, the following are evident: 
• Every group )( Γ∈A  of participants can recover at least one key.  
• No set of participants, involving less than t members, can recover any key. 
Let As  )1(≥  denote the number of keys that the participants in )( Γ∈A  can collectively recover. In 
Example 1, clearly, As =1 for },{ 21 PPA = , As =2 for },{ 31 PPA = , and so on.  
We now present the measures of group and participant anonymity as given in ZS. In connection 
with the use of any specific key, these quantify the level of confidentiality of the group of t partici-
pants that have collaborated to use the key, or that of any individual participant as a member of this 
group. To that effect, for a scheme S, given that the key )( JrK ×  has been used, let 
)](|Pr[ JrKA × denote the conditional probability that the group )( Γ∈A  of participants has used 
 4
this key, and let )](|Pr[ JrKPc ×  denote the conditional probability that participant cP  )1( nc ≤≤  
is in the group of participants that has used this key. Then the measures of group and participant 
anonymity of the scheme S are given by 
         µ = 1 –  max{ )](|Pr[ JrKA × : Γ∈A , lr ≤≤1 , ∆∈J },   (1) 
and 
  ρ = 1 –  max{ )](|Pr[ JrKPc × : nc ≤≤1 , lr ≤≤1 , ∆∈J },      (2)  
respectively. In the same spirit, the anonymity of any particular participant cP  is measured by  
)( cPρ = 1 –  max{ )](|Pr[ JrKPc × : lr ≤≤1 , ∆∈J }.    (3) 
All these measures are intended to protect against the worst possible scenario. A useful scheme 
should aim at achieving larger values of the quantities in (1)-(3). Moreover, it is desirable that par-
ticipant anonymity should be equitable, i.e., the values of )( cPρ , nc ≤≤1 , should not differ sig-
nificantly. Ideally, one should have )( cPρ = )/(1 nt− , nc ≤≤1 . A scheme achieving this is said to 
have optimal participant anonymity; cf. ZS.  
3. ZS scheme revisited 
ZS gave a scheme, focusing largely on BPHFs, and called this BPHF-MAC. They showed that this 
BPHF-MAC leads to improved anonymity compared to existing schemes. Their scheme is applica-
ble also to constructions from PHFs which need not be balanced. We call their procedure the ZS 
scheme in general. In Section 4, we will modify the ZS scheme to ensure further gains in anonym-
ity. Towards this, in this section, we revisit the ZS scheme in order to get a clear insight into its 
anonymity properties. In the process, a few examples are worked out in detail in order to indicate 
an anomaly in their results on participant anonymity. 
With reference to a ),( nt threshold access structure given by a ),,;(PHF tmnl , the ZS scheme 
has the following features: 
(i) The )(nt  groups of participants )( Γ∈A are all equally likely to use a key. 
(ii) If a group )( Γ∈A uses a key, then it employs any one of its available As  keys with equal prob-
ability. 
The main innovation by ZS lies in (ii) since in earlier schemes, any group A, with access to multiple 
keys of the form )( JrK × , had to always use the key with smallest r. ZS showed that a modifica-
tion as in (ii) entails gains in anonymity compared to the earlier schemes. We will show in Section 
4 that a modification to (i) above leads to further gains in anonymity.    
  For any key )( JrK × , let )( JrQ ×  denote the collection of the groups of participants that can 
recover this key, i.e.,  
)( JrQ ×  = {A: Γ∈A , the participants in A can recover the key )( JrK × }.   (4) 
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Clearly, by (i) above, the unconditional probability for any group )( Γ∈A  to use a key is  
                                                       Pr[A] = )/(1 nt ,                                                            (5) 
while by (ii), the conditional probability for the use of the key )( JrK × , given that the group A has 
used a key, is  
           ]|)(Pr[ AJrK × = 1−As , if )( JrQA ×∈ ,   
                         =  0,    otherwise,        (6) 
Hence, as also noted in equation (9) of ZS, in their scheme the key )( JrK ×  is used with uncondi-
tional probability 
)](Pr[ JrK × = ∑
×∈
−
)(
1
)(
1
JrQA
An
t
s = ∑
×∈
−
)(
1
)(
1
JrQG
Gn
t
s .      (7) 
Therefore, using the standard conditional probability formula 
)](|Pr[ JrKA × = 
)](Pr[
]Pr[]|)(Pr[
JrK
AAJrK
×
× ,        (8) 
 for any Γ∈A , under the ZS scheme, by (5)-(7) it follows that   
)](|Pr[ JrKA × = ∑
×∈
−
−
)(
1
1
JrQG
G
A
s
s ,    if )( JrQA ×∈ ,     (9) 
                    = 0,            otherwise. 
This is essentially same as their equation (10). Furthermore, given that the key )( JrK ×  has been 
used, participant cP  is in the group that has used this key if and only if APc ∈  and A has used the 
key, for some )( JrQA ×∈ . Thus for the ZS scheme, 
         )](|Pr[ JrKPc × = ∑ ××∈ )( )](|Pr[JrQA cA JrKAδ , nc ≤≤1 ,    (10) 
where the indicator cAδ equals 1 if APc ∈ , and 0 otherwise.  
3.1 Some Examples and their implications 
In their Section 3.2, ZS remarked that their BPHF-MAC scheme provides optimal and equitable 
participant anonymity and to establish this it was claimed in their Theorem 3.14 that for their 
scheme based on a ),,;(BPHF ttnl , 
)](|Pr[ JrKPc × = nt / , for every c and every Jr × ,     (11) 
and that as a result 
             )( cPρ = )/(1 nt− , for every c.         (12) 
Note that ZS had used the notation ]|Pr[ rPc  rather than )](|Pr[ JrKPc ×  in their Theorem 3.14 as 
m equals t in a ),,;(PHF ttnl , and hence ∆  has a unique member tJ ...12= . More generally, at the 
end of Section 4 of ZS, it was claimed that for their scheme based on a ),,;(BPHF tmnl  
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)( cPρ = )/(1 nm− , for every c.         (13) 
The next two examples demonstrate that the assertions (11)-(13) made in ZS about their scheme for 
BPHFs are not true in general. 
Example 1 (continued). This example is based on a )2,2,6;3(BPHF . Consider first the key 
)121( ×K . Note that )121( ×Q  consists of nine pairs of participants, namely, ),( dcA = },{ dc PP , 
where ∈c {1, 2, 3} and ∈d  {4, 5, 6}, and these pairs can also recover varying numbers of other 
keys in addition to )121( ×K .  The As  values for these pairs ),( dcA are as shown below: 
 Pair A(1,4) A(1,5) A(1,6) A(2,4) A(2,5) A(2,6) A(3,4) A(3,5) A(3,6) 
As   1      2   3      2      3      2      3   2      1   
Hence (9) yields 
                )]121(|),(Pr[ ×KdcA  = 51  for ),( dc = (1, 4), (3, 6);    
        = 10
1  for ),( dc = (1, 5), (2, 4), (2,6), (3, 5); 
      = 15
1  for ),( dc = (1, 6), (2, 5), (3, 4).       
Since 1P belongs to A(1,4), A(1,5) and A(1,6), it now follows from (10) that )]121(|Pr[ 1 ×KP  = 
5
1 + 10
1 + 15
1 = 30
11 . Similarly,    
           )]121(|Pr[ ×KPc  = 3011 for c = 1, 3, 4, 6; 
                = 15
4  for c = 2, 5.         (14)  
Turning to the keys )122( ×K  and )123( ×K , it may be verified in a similar manner that  
max{ )]122(|Pr[ ×KA : Γ∈A } = max{ )]123(|Pr[ ×KA : Γ∈A }= 51 . 
Also, )]122(|Pr[ ×KPc = 3011 or 154 , for c=2,3,4,5, or c =1,6, respectively, while )]123(|Pr[ ×KPc = 
30
11  or 15
4 , for c =1,2,5,6, or c =3,4, respectively. Hence by (1)-(3), we get in this example the ano-
nymity measures 
µ = 54 ,  ρ = 3019 ,  )( cPρ = 3019 , 61 ≤≤ c ,     (15) 
for the ZS scheme. Here t = 2, n = 6, and the right-hand sides of (11) and (12) equal 1/3 and 2/3 re-
spectively, which are not in agreement with (14) and (15) obtained via explicit calculation. □ 
Example 2. Consider a )3,6,18;3(BPHF  represented by the 183× array 
   B =  1 6 3 2 6 2 1 5 2 5 1 4 5 6 3 3 4 4 
           1 6 5 1 5 4 2 4 3 1 6 2 2 3 6 4 3 5 
           5 2 6 2 3 3 3 4 6 1 4 2 6 5 1 5 1 4 
 
accessed from the PHF tables by Walker (2011). Here t =3 and as in Example 1, this B gives a 
(3,18) threshold access structure with 18 [=(3)(6)] key components, 60 )](3[ 63=  keys and 18 par-
ticipants 181,..., PP  corresponding to the columns of B. Consider the key )1231( ×K ={(1,1), (1,2), 
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(1,3)} and note that )1231( ×Q  consists of 27 triplets of participants, namely, ),,( edcA = 
},,{ edc PPP , where ∈c {1, 7, 11}, ∈d  {4, 6, 9} and ∈e  {3, 15, 16}. The As  values for these trip-
lets are as follows:  
Triplet 
As  
A(1,4,3)   A(1,4,15)   A(1,4,16)   A(1,6,3)   A(1,6,15)   A(1,6,16)   A(1,9,3)   
      2              2                1                 3              3                1                2 
Triplet 
As  
A(1,9,15)   A(1,9,16)   A(7,4,3)   A(7,4,15)   A(7,4,16)   A(7,6,3)   A(7,6,15)   
      3                2                3               3                3                2              2  
Triplet 
As  
A(7,6,16)   A(7,9,3)   A(7,9,15)   A(7,9,16)   A(11,4,3)   A(11,4,15)   A(11,4,16) 
      1                2              3                 3                  3                2                  3 
Triplet 
As  
A(11,6,3)   A(11,6,15)   A(11,6,16)   A(11,9,3)   A(11,9,15)   A(11,9,16)     
       3                 2                   2                 2                 2                  3 
 
Hence with 
1Γ = {(1,4,16), (1,6,16), (7,6,16)}, 
2Γ = {(1,4,3), (1,4,15), (1,9,3), (1,9,16), (7,6,3), (7,6,15), (7,9,3), (11,4,15) , 
  (11,6,15), (11,6,16), (11,9,3), (11,9,15)}, 
3Γ = {(1,6,3), (1,6,15), (1,9,15), (7,4,3), (7,4,15), (7,4,16), (7,9,15), (7,9,16),  
        (11,4,3), (11,4,16), (11,6,3), (11,9,16)}, 
it follows from (9) that 
                )]1231(|),,(Pr[ ×KedcA  = 131  for 1),,( Γ∈edc ,   
     = 26
1  for 2),,( Γ∈edc , 
    = 39
1  for 3),,( Γ∈edc .         
Since 1P  belongs to ),,1( edA for ∈d  {4, 6, 9} and ∈e  {3, 15, 16}, now (10) yields 
)]1231(|Pr[ 1 ×KP  = 1312× + 2614× + 3913× = 7830 .  
Similarly,   
               ]1231|Pr[ ×cP  = 7832 for c = 16; 
             = 78
30 for c = 1, 6; 
             = 78
25 for c = 4, 7; 
             = 78
23 for c = 3, 9, 11, 15; 
             = 0  for every other c.           
In view of the aforesaid expressions for )]1231(|),,(Pr[ ×KedcA  and )]1231(|Pr[ ×KPc , even 
without considering the other keys, it follows from (1) and  (2) that in this example  
13
12≤µ ,    7846≤ρ ,           (16) 
for the ZS scheme. Here m = 6, n = 18, and the right-hand side of (13) equals 2/3, implying ρ  = 
2/3, which is not in agreement with (16) obtained via explicit calculation.        □ 
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 Examples 1 and 2 demonstrate a conflict between the reality and equations (11)-(13) as claimed 
in ZS. This can be attributed to the fact that the derivation of these equations in ZS does not ac-
count for the quantities As  which play a crucial role in their scheme in the sense that any group of 
participants )( Γ∈A uses one of its As  keys with equal probability. In some situations, however, 
the values of the anonymity measures obtained by (11)-(13) may coincide with the values in reality, 
as is the case in Example 3 below. 
Example 3. Consider a )3,3,9;4(BPHF  represented by the 94× array (cf. ZS) 
            B = 1 3 2 2 3 2 3 1 1, 
    1 3 1 3 1 2 2 2 3  
    1 2 2 1 3 3 1 2 3 
    3 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 2 
which gives a (3, 9) threshold access structure with 12 key components, 4 keys and 9 participants 
91,..., PP . Calculations similar to those in Examples 1 and 2 show that here µ = 2120 , ρ = 32  and  
)( cPρ = 32 , 91 ≤≤ c , for the ZS scheme.                 □ 
While the )( cPρ  values in Example 3 are consistent with (12), this coincidence is only the result 
of some kind of symmetry inherent in the associated BPHF; such symmetry may not hold for all 
BPHFs in general, as illustrated in Examples 1 and 2. The points noted in this section underscore 
the need to set (11)-(13) in the proper perspective. Does there exist a scheme which will be truly 
optimal or equitable with respect to participant anonymity in the sense of ensuring the validity of 
(11)-(13) for a ),( nt threshold access structure given by any BPHF? In Section 4, we will present 
such a new scheme which will also entail gains in anonymity, compared to the ZS scheme, for both 
balanced and unbalanced PHFs; cf. Remarks 2-4 in that section.   
3.2. Some inequalities related to anonymity measures 
We continue with the ZS scheme, as given by a ),,;(PHF tmnl  which need not necessarily be bal-
anced, and present some inequalities on the anonymity properties of this scheme. These will be 
needed in Section 4 for comparative purposes. As before, let B = )( rcb , lr ≤≤1 , nc ≤≤1 , be the 
nl × array depicting the PHF. For lr ≤≤1  and mj ≤≤1 , write  
),( jrF ={c: nc ≤≤1 , rcb = j },       (17) 
i.e., ),( jrF  is the index set of participants cP  who get the key component ),( jr . Let ),( jrf be the 
cardinality of ),( jrF  and, to avoid trivialities, assume that ),( jrf ≥1, for every r and j. Write 
)( Jrq × for the cardinality of the set )( JrQ ×  defined in (4), lr ≤≤1 , ∆∈J . 
Lemma 1. Consider the ZS scheme based on a ),,;(PHF tmnl . Then for every lr ≤≤1  and J 
= tjj ...1 )( ∆∈ , 
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(a) max{ )](|Pr[ JrKA × : Γ∈A }≥ 1)}({ −× Jrq . 
(b) max{ )](|Pr[ JrKPc × : )},( ijrFc∈ ≥ 1)},({ −ijrf , ti ≤≤1 . 
Proof. (a) By (9), )](|Pr[ JrKA × = 0, for )( JrQA ×∉ , so that  
max{ )](|Pr[ JrKA × : Γ∈A }= max{ )](|Pr[ JrKA × : )( JrQA ×∈ }.    (18) 
Now by (9), the sum of the )( Jrq ×  quantities )](|Pr[ JrKA × , over )( JrQA ×∈ , equals 1, i.e., 
their arithmetic mean equals 1)}({ −× Jrq . Hence (a) follows from (18). 
(b) Consider any fixed i )1( ti ≤≤ . Given that the key )( JrK × , J = tjj ...1 , has been used, exactly 
one member of the group of participants using the key must be having the key component ),( ijr , 
i.e., by (17), one and only one participant cP , with ),( ijrFc∈ , certainly belongs to this group. 
Therefore, the sum of the ),( ijrf quantities )](|Pr[ JrKPc × , over ),( ijrFc∈ , equals 1. Hence 
(b) follows arguing as in (a).                      □    
From Lemma 1 and the definitions of µ  and ρ  in (1) and (2), the following is evident. 
Lemma 2.  For the ZS scheme based on a ),,;(PHF tmnl , 
(a) µ ≤  )([min{1 Jrq ×− : lr ≤≤1 , 1}]−∆∈J . 
(b) ρ ≤  :),([min{1 jrf− lr ≤≤1 , 1}]1 −≤≤ mj .       □ 
4. A new scheme: the proportional scheme 
With reference to a ),( nt threshold access structure given by a ),,;(PHF tmnl which may or may not 
be balanced, we propose the following new scheme:  
)(i ′Any group of participants )( Γ∈A uses a key with probability proportional to As . 
(ii) If a group )( Γ∈A uses a key, then it employs any of its available As  keys with equal probabil-
ity. 
While (ii) is the same as that for the ZS scheme, )(i ′  differs from their (i) and takes cognizance of 
the variation in the As  values across .Γ∈A  This modification will be seen to have useful conse-
quences; in particular, when based on a ),,;(BPHF tmnl , this new scheme provides completely eq-
uitable participant as well as group anonymity. Moreover, when m = t, this scheme ensures optimal 
participant anonymity too.   
Hereafter, this new scheme given by )(i ′  and (ii) will be referred to as the proportional scheme. 
An algorithm for its easy implementation is presented in the next section. We now examine the be-
havior of this proportional scheme with respect to anonymity. 
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Theorem 1. Consider the proportional scheme based on a ),,;(PHF tmnl . Then for every lr ≤≤1  
and J = tjj ...1 )( ∆∈ , 
(a) )](|Pr[ JrKA × = 1)}({ −× Jrq , if )( JrQA ×∈ , 
                  = 0,       otherwise.              
(b) )](|Pr[ JrKPc × = 1)},({ −ijrf , if ),( ijrFc∈ , ti ≤≤1 , 
                      = 0,       otherwise.              
Proof. (a) Using the same notation as in Section 3, by )(i ′ ,  
Pr[A] = 0/ ssA ,            (19) 
where 0s equals the sum of the quantities As , over .Γ∈A  Also, (6) continues to hold because of 
(ii). Therefore, recalling that )( Jrq ×  is the cardinality of )( JrQ ×  , we get  
)](Pr[ JrK × = ∑
×∈
−
)(
1
0 )/(
JrQA
AA sss =
0
)(
s
Jrq × ,        (20)  
as a counterpart of (7). Now (a) follows from (6), (19) and (20) invoking the conditional probability 
formula (8).  
(b) In view of (a), for nc ≤≤1 , as a counterpart of (10), we get   
)](|Pr[ JrKPc × = ∑ ××∈ )( ]|Pr[JrQA cA JrAδ  = ∑× ×∈ )()(
1
JrQA
cAJrq
δ .  (21) 
By (4), any group A belongs to )( JrQ × , ,...1 tjjJ =  if and only if it includes exactly one partici-
pant having the key component ),( ijr , ti ≤≤1 . In view of (17), therefore, )( JrQ ×  consists of the 
groups of participants  
))(),...,2(),1(( tcccA = },...,,{ )()2()1( tccc PPP ,    ∈)(ic ),( ijrF , ti ≤≤1 ,   (22) 
and hence 
)( Jrq × =∏
=
t
i
ijrf
1
),( .          (23) 
Consider now a particular participant cP , with ),( 1jrFc∈ . By (22), there are ),(2 iti jrf=Π  
groups of participants, namely ))(),...,2(,( tcccA , ∈)(ic ),( ijrF , ti ≤≤2 , which include cP  and 
belong to )( JrQ × . Thus for such a cP  
∑
×∈ )( JrQA cA
δ = ∏
=
t
i
ijrf
2
),( , 
so that by (21) and (23), )](|Pr[ JrKPc × = 11)},({ −jrf . Similarly, the conclusion of (b) holds for 
any cP , with ),( ijrFc∈ , ti ≤≤2 . Finally, if cP  is such that ),( ijrFc∉ for every i  )1( ti ≤≤ , 
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then none of the groups, constituting )( JrQ ×  and listed in (22), can include cP . As a result, then 
)](|Pr[ JrKPc × = 0 by (21). This completes the proof of (b).            □ 
The next result is immediate from Theorem 1 and the definitions of µ  and ρ  in (1) and (2). 
Theorem 2. For the proportional scheme based on a ),,;(PHF tmnl ,  
(a) µ = )([min{1 Jrq ×− : lr ≤≤1 , 1}]−∆∈J . 
(b) ρ = :),([min{1 jrf− lr ≤≤1 , 1}]1 −≤≤ mj .         □ 
Remark 1. By (17), ),(1 jrf
m
j=Σ = n, for lr ≤≤1 . This, in conjunction with (23), implies that    
:),(min{ jrf lr ≤≤1 , }1 mj ≤≤ ≤ mn / ,     
and        )(min{ Jrq × : lr ≤≤1 , }∆∈J ≤  tmn )/( , 
equality being attained in both cases if and only if ),( jrf = mn /  for every r and j, in which case 
the PHF is balanced. Since tm ≥ , it follows that the expressions for µ  and ρ  in Theorem 2 satisfy 
µ ≤ tnm )/(1− ≤ tnt )/(1−  and  ρ ≤  )/(1 nm− ≤ )/(1 nt− . 
Therefore, from consideration of anonymity, given l, n and t, the proportional scheme should ide-
ally be based on a ),,;(BPHF ttnl  if it exists; otherwise, one should attempt to keep m close to t and 
the ),( jrf  as nearly equal as possible.                   □ 
From (3) and Theorems 1 and 2, we get Corollary 1 below summarizing, in continuation of Re-
mark 1, the anonymity properties of the proportional scheme, when based on a ),,;(BPHF tmnl .  
Corollary 1. Consider the proportional scheme based  on a ),,;(BPHF tmnl .Then 
(a) For every lr ≤≤1  and J = tjj ...1 )( ∆∈ , 
(i) )](|Pr[ JrKA ×   = tnm )/( , if )( JrQA ×∈ , 
                            = 0,      otherwise.              
(ii) )](|Pr[ JrKPc ×  = nm / ,   if ),( ijrFc∈ , ti ≤≤1 , 
                          = 0,      otherwise.  
(b) µ = tnm )/(1− . 
(c) ρ = )/(1 nm− . 
(d) )( cPρ = )/(1 nm− , nc ≤≤1 .                 □ 
The above results have major implications as remarked below. 
Remark 2: Lemma 2 and Theorem 2 show that, for any arbitrary ),,;(PHF tmnl , balanced or not, 
the values of the anonymity measures µ  and ρ  for the proportional scheme are never less than 
their counterparts under the ZS scheme. Indeed, as will be seen later through examples, the propor-
tional scheme often yields larger values of µ  and ρ , thus leading to gains in anonymity.  □ 
Remark 3: Corollary 1(d) shows that for any ),,;(BPHF tmnl , the proportional scheme ensures the 
attainment of (13) and hence provides completely equitable participant anonymity. Furthermore, 
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when m = t, by Corollary 1(a)(ii) and (d), this scheme ensures the attainment of (11) and (12) as 
well and hence provides optimal participant anonymity too. In this connection, note that if tm = , 
then ∆  has a unique member tJ ...12= , so that in this case, the union of the sets ),( ijrF , ti ≤≤1 , 
equals {1, 2,…, n} and Corollary 1(a)(ii) reduces to (11). Thus, in addition to enhancing anonym-
ity, the proportional scheme also guarantees the assertions in (11)-(13) which, as seen earlier, do 
not hold in general for the ZS scheme based on BPHFs.              □ 
Remark 4: Corollary 1(a)(i) shows that for a ),,;(BPHF tmnl , the proportional scheme ensures 
completely equitable group anonymity as well, in the sense of achieving 
max{ )](|Pr[ JrKA × : lr ≤≤1 , ∆∈J }= tnm )/( ,  for every )( Γ∈A . 
This property is not shared by the ZS scheme – e.g., in Example 1, given by a )2,2,6;3(BPHF , it 
may be checked that the quantities max{ )](|Pr[ JrKA × : lr ≤≤1 , ∆∈J } can equal 51 , 101 or 151 , 
depending on the choice of )( Γ∈A , under the ZS scheme.             □ 
 In order to illustrate the point noted in Remark 2 above, we give a few examples. For this, we 
first go back to Examples 1-3 and compare µ  and ρ  for the ZS and the proportional schemes. 
These examples are based on BPHFs and hence Corollary 1 is applicable to the latter scheme.  
Example    ZS scheme      Proportional scheme 
Example 1  µ = 54 ,  ρ = 3019     µ = 98 ,  ρ = 32  
Example 2  13
12≤µ , 3923≤ρ     µ = 2726 ,  ρ = 32  
Example 3  µ = 2120 , ρ = 32     µ = 2726 ,  ρ = 32  
Clearly, theµ for the proportional scheme is larger than that for the ZS scheme in all these exam-
ples. The same happens with ρ  as well, except in Example 3 where there is a tie between the two.  
The above examples are for balanced PHFs. We now give two examples to compare these 
schemes for unbalanced PHFs. 
Example 4. Consider a )2,2,9;4(PHF  represented by the 94× array 
   B = 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2, 
               1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 
               1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 
               1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 
which gives a (2, 9) threshold access structure with 8 key components, 4 keys and 9 participants.  
Here the pair ))2,(),1,(( rfrf  equals (4, 5) or (5, 4) for every r.  Hence by (23) and Theorem 2, for 
the proportional scheme, µ = 2019 and ρ = 43 . Both these are larger than the corresponding quantities 
µ = 2623  and ρ = 10473  for the ZS scheme, as calculations similar to those in Example 1 show.  □ 
Example 5. Consider a )3,5,12;3(PHF  represented by the 123× array (cf. ZS) 
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                 B =  2 4 4 4 5 1 5 2 3 3 3 1, 
          3 1 5 4 5 1 2 5 2 4 3 3 
          1 4 5 1 3 2 1 2 4 2 3 5 
which gives a (3,12) threshold access structure with 15 key components, 30 keys and 12 partici-
pants 121,..., PP . For the ZS scheme, calculations similar to those in Example 2 yield 
 max{ ]1242|Pr[ ×A : Γ∈A } = 173   and  max{ ]1242|Pr[ ×cP : 121 ≤≤ c }= 1710 , 
so that by (1) and (2), µ ≤ 1714  and ρ ≤ 177 . Here the vector ))5,(...,),1,(( rfrf equals (2, 2, 2, 3, 3) 
or a permutation thereof for every r.  Hence by (23) and Theorem 2, for the proportional scheme, 
µ = 87  and ρ = 21 . Again, both µ  and ρ  are larger than what the ZS scheme achieves.    □ 
5. Algorithmic implementation of the proportional scheme 
We now present a simple algorithm for the implementation of the proportional scheme based on a 
),,;(PHF tmnl as depicted by an nl × array B. The tl ×  subarray of B corresponding to any 
group )( Γ∈A of t participants will be denoted by )(AB . Any row of )(AB  having t distinct symbols 
is said to separate A and determines a key that A can recover – e.g., if the rth row of )(AB  has dis-
tinct symbols tjj ,...,1  )...( 1 tjj << , then A can recover the key )( JrK × , tjjJ ...1= .  
Algorithm 
I.   One of the )(nt  groups inΓ , say A, is activated at random with equal probability. 
II. Group A selects one of the rows of )(AB at random with equal probability. If this row separates 
A, then group A goes to Step III; else, the algorithm returns to Step I. 
III. Group A employs the key as determined by the separating row in Step II.     
 This algorithm is very similar to the one for the ZS scheme (ZS, p. 148) with the only change be-
ing that here selection of a non-separating row in Step II returns the algorithm to Step I, whereas in 
ZS selection of a non-separating row in Step II returns the algorithm to the beginning of Step II it-
self. The next result establishes that our algorithm, indeed, implements the proportional scheme.  
Theorem 3. The above algorithm ensures the following: 
(a) Any group of participants )( Γ∈A uses a key with probability proportional to As . 
(b) If a group )( Γ∈A uses a key, then it employs any one of its available As  keys with equal prob-
ability. 
Proof.  For notational simplicity, let N = )(nt .Then the probability that any one cycle of Steps I and 
II ends with group A going to Step III is equal to lsN A /
1−  . Similarly, the probability that such a 
cycle is inconclusive (i.e., ends with a return to Step I) is 
∑ −
Γ∈
−
G
G lsN )}/(1{
1 = )/(1 0
1 lsN −− , 
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where 0s is the sum of the quantities Gs , over Γ∈G . Now, group A eventually makes use of a key 
if and only if there is one cycle of Steps I and II that ends with group A going to Step III, all previ-
ous cycles being inconclusive. Hence the probability for group A to use a key is 
          )/()}/(1{ 110
1
1
lsNlsN A
j
j
−−−∞
=
−∑ = 0/ ssA , 
which proves (a). Part (b) is evident from symmetry considerations.          □ 
6. Beyond PHFs 
The proportional scheme appears to be quite promising even for ),( nt  threshold access structures 
which are given by combinatorial entities other than PHFs. Consider a general setup with  
(i) p key components 1, 2, …, p,  
(ii) v keys vKK ,...,1 , each of which is a set in {1, 2,…, p} and which together cover {1, 
2,…, p}, and 
(iii) n participants nPP ,...,1 among whom the key components are distributed,  
such that every group of t participants can recover at least one key, and no set of participants, in-
volving less than t members, can recover any key. 
 As before, let Γ be the collection all groups of t participants. Analogously to (1)-(3), we now 
consider   
         µ = 1 – max{ ]|Pr[ iKA : Γ∈A , vi ≤≤1 },        (24) 
  ρ = 1 – max{ ]|Pr[ ic KP : nc ≤≤1 , vi ≤≤1 },       (25)  
  )( cPρ = 1 – max{ ]|Pr[ ic KP : vi ≤≤1 },        (26) 
as measures of overall group anonymity, overall participant anonymity, and anonymity for partici-
pant cP , respectively. Here the quantities ]|Pr[ iKA  and ]|Pr[ ic KP  are obvious counterparts of 
)](|Pr[ JrKA ×  and )](|Pr[ JrKPc ×  as defined earlier. Let iq  denote the number of groups of t 
participants that can recover the key iK , vi ≤≤1 . 
The same arguments as those leading to Lemma 2(a) and Theorem 2(a) now show that  
 µ ≤  iq[min{1− : 1}]1 −≤≤ vi ,          
for the ZS scheme, whereas  
 µ = iq[min{1− : 1}]1 −≤≤ vi ,          (27) 
for the proportional scheme. Thus the value of µ   for the proportional scheme is never less than 
that under the ZS scheme. However, no such statement can be made in full generality about ρ  be-
cause counterparts of the sets ),( jrF  in (17) are no longer available here, thus precluding any ex-
tension of Lemma 2(b) and Theorem 2(b). Nevertheless, even in the general setup, the proportional 
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scheme can perform better than the ZS scheme in respect of both µ  and ρ . An illustrative exam-
ple follows.    
Example 6.  Let t = 3 and p = n = 7. The key components distributed to participant cP , 71 ≤≤ c , 
are as listed in the cth column of the array 
              P = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7, 
             2 3 4 5 6 7 1 
             4 5 6 7 1 2 3 
i.e., 1P  gets key components 1, 2, 4, while 2P  gets 2, 3, 5, and so on. There are v = 7 keys iK , 
71 ≤≤ i , where iK  includes all key components except i . Thus each iK  contains six key compo-
nents. The columns of P, when interpreted as blocks, form a balanced incomplete block design. 
Since any two distinct participants have exactly one common key component, it is easy to verify 
that the above gives a (3,7) threshold access structure, indeed. As in Example 2, let ),,( edcA = 
},,{ edc PPP . Then the keys that various triplets of participants can recover are as shown below. 
 
Triplets Keys that can 
be recovered 
A(2,3,4), A(2,3,6), A(2,4,6), A(3,4,6) Only 1K  
A(3,4,5), A(3,4,7), A(3,5,7), A(4,5,7) Only 2K  
A(1,4,5), A(1,4,6), A(1,5,6), A(4,5,6) Only 3K  
A(2,5,6), A(2,5,7), A(2,6,7), A(5,6,7) Only 4K  
A(1,3,6), A(1,3,7), A(1,6,7), A(3,6,7) Only 5K  
A(1,2,4), A(1,2,7), A(1,4,7), A(2,4,7) Only 6K  
A(1,2,3), A(1,2,5), A(1,3,5), A(2,3,5) Only 7K  
A(1,2,6), A(1,3,4), A(1,5,7), A(2,3,7), A(2,4,5), A(3,5,6), A(4,6,7) All seven keys 
 
Consider first the ZS scheme and the key 1K . The above table exhibits the 1q =11 triplets that 
can recover 1K ; of these, four can recover only 1K  and the rest can recover all the seven keys. 
Hence proceeding as in (9) and (10), we get  max{ ]|Pr[ 1KA : Γ∈A }= 51 , and 
 ]|Pr[ 1KPc = 35
24 , for c = 2, 3, 4, 6; 
             = 35
3 , for c = 1, 5, 7. 
Based on similar calculations for the other keys as well, one can invoke (24)-(26) to check that 
µ = 54 , ρ = 3511 and )( cPρ = 3511 , 71 ≤≤ c , for the ZS scheme.  
 We next turn to the proportional scheme. Then (27) yields µ = 1110 , since iq = 11 for every i .  
Furthermore, analogously to Theorem 1(a), ]|Pr[ iKA  = 11
1 , for every iQA∈ , where iQ  represents 
the collection of triplets of participants that can recover iK , 71 ≤≤ i . Hence, invoking (25) and 
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(26) again, it is not hard to see from the above table that ρ = 115 and )( cPρ = 115 , 71 ≤≤ c , for the 
proportional scheme. Thus in this example, the proportional scheme makes the values of µ , ρ  and 
each )( cPρ  much larger than those under the ZS scheme.            □ 
 The last example highlights the need for further exploration of the behavior of the proportional 
scheme vis-à-vis the ZS scheme with reference to the general setup of this section. While this is be-
yond the scope of the present article which is focused on schemes based on PHFs, we conclude 
with the hope that our endeavor will generate interest in this and related issues.   
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